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1 Introduction
Constructing an intelligent agent is the main goal of artiﬁcial intelligence. To this purpose, the
notions of agency and intelligence need to be precisely deﬁned. It is well known that intelligence
is hard to formalize as an abstract concept. To overcome this, Stuart Russell —among others—
suggested the term rational agency as an alternative characterization for intelligent agency. In
his own words [10], “rational agents [. . . ] are agents whose actions make sense from the point
of view of the information possessed by the agents and its goals”. Simply put, a rational agent
is an agent that “does the right thing based on its beliefs” [6]. Naturally, the construction of
rational agents is by no means an easy task.
Software Engineering has developed the notion of architecture in order to provide proper
modularization for coping with large projects in a successful way. As formalizing rational
agency is a complex task, diﬀerent agent architectures have been proposed. The agent archi-
tecture supplies a separation of concerns, inducing a tentative modularization. However, at the
present state of aﬀairs, to build a fully rational agent is rather unattainable; several important
issues remain overlooked, or are just partially addressed (i.e., addressed under too unrealistic
assumptions). Rao and Wooldridge [8] underscore the following aspects:
Rational agents are not solitary entities living in an uninhabited static environment;
they are embedded in a continuously changing environment and have to constantly
interact with other agents. Hence, communication with other agents and interaction
with the environment are key concerns within this field....
In this paper we sketch an agent architecture suitable to be used as a tool for exploring agent
perception and multiagent interaction. Nowadays, there is no strict correspondence between
the theoretical work in rational agents and their implementation. In this respect, it is our
intention to reach a good trade-oﬀ between expressiveness and implementability.
Argumentative frameworks [3] constitute an appropriate formalism for knowledge represen-
tation and reasoning (mainly) as a consequence of its ability to deal with incomplete and/or
contradictory information. An argumentative system underpins our architecture in order to
represent the agent’s knowledge, and perform inferences from it. The next section delineates
the proposed architecture, and discusses its main components. Finally section 3 resumes the
related work.
2 Agent architecture
As stated in the introduction, there is no general consensus on what rational agency is. However,
most approaches share the following features:
• Reactivity: the ability to sense and act selectively.
• Autonomy: goal-directed, proactive, and self-starting behaviour.
• Inferential capabilities: the agent reasons from its knowledge and goes beyond the
information given; it may have explicit models of itself, the environment, and/or other
agents.
• Social capabilities: the ability to cooperate and/or coordinate with other agents to
achieve common goals.
Any architecture for rational agents is likely to accommodate many of these features. Our
proposed architecture (see Figure 1) is grounded on these four items. In the sequel, we detail
the role of each component.
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Figure 1: An sketch of the agent architecture.
2.1 Knowledge base
The knowledge base is the information repository of the agent. Even though multi-modal logics
are usually the ﬁrst choice for modelling an agent’s mental state, the expressiveness of these
approaches tends to be lost in the transition towards practical systems [8]. Logic programming
provides a useful model for the epistemic state of an agent, as its formal speciﬁcation and
the corresponding implementation are closely related. Unfortunately, conventional logic pro-
gramming cannot deal with partial and potentially contradictory information [4], a recurring
situation when modelling practical agents. This restriction has motivated the development of
extensions to logic programming that deal with these inconveniences. Observation-based defea-
sible logic programming (odelp) [2] is a formalism recently developed to model the epistemic
state of agents in dynamic domains. odelp combines the advantages of logic programming
with defeasible argumentation and perception mechanisms. Accordingly, we have chosen the
language of odelp to conform the knowledge base of our agent.
2.2 Inference engine
To draw a conclusion from an odelp program arguments for and against a certain literal
are obtained. These arguments undergo a dialectical analysis that establishes their current
statuses. Hence, a query q can obtain as answer yes if there exists a justiﬁed argument for
q, no if there exists a justiﬁed argument for the complement of q, or undecided if neither q
nor its complement are supported by a justiﬁed argument. In our architecture, the inference
engine uses an odelp program as a knowledge base to solve queries posed by the other units.
2.3 Planning unit
The planning unit exercises the control of the agent. It constructs plans to achieve agent’s
goals based upon the current epistemic state. In this setting, we understand a plan to mean
any sequence of actions. The basic actions available to the agent involve consulting other agents
about their epistemic state, engaging them in negotiations, and any other elementary operation
performed by its eﬀectors.
2.4 Communication unit
The communication unit embodies the high-level perceptors and eﬀectors that manage the
interaction among agents. Two levels can be identiﬁed. The ﬁrst one, atomic interaction,
includes both querying agents to gain insights about their epistemic states, and accomplishing
queries from other agents. In contrast composite interaction comprehends any non-atomic
interaction among agents, such as coordination, cooperation, and negotiation.
Atomic interaction is easily achieved: queries can be posed by means of the communication
unit, and the inquiries received can be easily answered through the inference engine. We assume
that every agent is aware of the existence of its counterparts: the communication unit maintains
the information required to access any of them. Note that atomic interaction among agents
exchanges unstructured information only. Thus, no speciﬁc protocol is required.
For composite interaction, we focus our attention on deliberation. In our approach most
of the other high level interactions (such as cooperation, persuasion, negotiation, etc.) as by-
products of deliberation. As deliberation we understand the process through which a set of
entities come to mutually accepted position regarding a given issue. In contrast to atomic
interaction, the deliberation process involves the exchange of elaborated evidence about the
topic being considered. For instance, in this context the parties exchange arguments either
supporting or rebutting a given claim. Clearly, a protocol governing these transactions needs
to be deﬁned.
2.5 Perceptors and eﬀectors
A rational agent residing in a complex dynamic environment must be able to gather information
by sensing its surroundings [6]. The perceptor unit is responsible for handling this interaction,
reporting environment changes so they can be incorporated into the knowledge base. The
eﬀector unit executes a set of actions over the world, as to follow the requirements of the
planner. This unit often owns a variety of actions. As we concentrate on agent perception and
multi-agent negotiation, the architecture does not require any particular action besides those
provided by the communication unit. Consequently, Figure 1 depicts the eﬀector unit in dashed
lines.
3 Current and related work
In this section we survey the main ideas on agent perception and multi-agent negotiation being
developed using the proposed architecture. These results comprise the research being conducted
in two diﬀerent, but interconnected, research lines.
3.1 Agent perception
We already stressed the importance of considering a rational agent as an entity interacting in
a changing environment. Clearly, it is impossible to provide the agent with all the required
information from its conception; this prompts for the deﬁnition of mechanisms suitable for
agent perception. Our perceptor unit senses the environment, providing concrete facts about
the world. However, the agent cannot monitor the entire state of the world at all time; the best
perception can do is to provide the agent with a sort of sampling at discrete times, or over shot
time intervals [6].
Consistency is an important issue when formalizing perception. The world, as it evolves,
need not be consistent with its previous states (i.e., a new perception may contradict a previous
one). An agent sensing its environment must be able to deal with the inconsistencies arising
from its perceptions. Consequently, the argumentative framework encoding the agent’s knowl-
edge must be able to distinguish its previous knowledge from the new information acquired
through perception. In order to cope with this problem, the odelp framework is provided with
the ability to update the knowledge base as it receives new perceptions. An in-depth treatment
of these issues is outside the scope of this paper. More details concerning this approach can be
found in [2].
3.2 Interaction among agents
The traditional approach for modelling multiagent interaction resorts to game theory [9]. Al-
though several issues have been explored under this conception, most of them rely on a strong
assumption: each agent should be aware of the complete pay-oﬀ matrix before the interaction
even starts. The implications of this strong assumption undermines the applicability of the
whole approach.1
In a prominent paper, Parsons et al. [5] develop the idea that multiagent interaction can
be seen as an argumentative process. In an attempt to follow their intuitions, we also adopt
an argumentative framework to model multi-agent negotiation (note that an argumentative
framework is already present in our architecture).
Recent progress in defeasible argumentation favours dialectical characterisation, such as
Prakken’s dialogue games [7], Simari’s dialectical trees [11], etc. Under this particular view,
1It should be noted that there also exist variants where such a matrix can be computed dynamically.
two parties take opposing positions regarding a certain matter, and alternatively pose reasons
backing their stances. This view extends quite naturally to a set of three or more agents
interacting with each other.
We content that, instead of circumscribing only to the actual interaction, the entire process
should be taken into account. At the current state of the research, the following steps have
been identiﬁed:
1. An agent A decides that it needs to interact with another agent B. A’s planning unit is
responsible for making this decision.
2. Agent A engages the chosen counterpart B. Interaction between them can start once A’s
communication unit contacts B’s.
3. The actual interaction takes place. In this step, the interaction is conducted according to
an argumentative protocol.
4. The outcome of the interaction is accounted. Note that when a given agent does not
succeed in a negotiation process, it accepts the issue under debate. Its knowledge base
becomes contradictory. In this step, the ability to deal with contradictory information
becomes indispensable.
Part of our current research work involves further reﬁnement of the above steps. In partic-
ular, the interested reader is referred to [1] for a detailed discussion concerning steps 3 and 4.
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